我校bat365在线中国官网登录入口张亿军老师在T2级别期刊——《Journal of environmental management》上发表题为“Non-linear effects of heterogeneous environmental regulations on industrial relocation: Do compliance costs work?”。论文第一作者张亿军为bat365在线中国官网登录入口特任副教授。
Abstract / 摘要：
Reasonably designing environmental regulations for compliance-driven industrial relocation can avoid new pollution havens. The Cournot duopoly model simulates that the necessary condition for industrial relocation is differentiated market costs. Then, based on the province-industrial data of six Chinese pollution-intensive industries during 2005-2019, this study applies spatial Durbin model to explore the non-linear effects of heterogeneous environmental regulations on industrial relocation. Results shown that command-and-control environmental regulation manifests a U-shaped curve with local industrial relocation, with inverted U-shaped spillover effect radiating a road distance of 650 km, and both internal and external costs play the mediating roles; Market incentive environmental regulation has inverted U-shaped curves with industrial relocation in local and neighboring regions, it creates dual costs and works well in both short and long terms, which is the most potential regulatory tool to avoid pollution relocation accompanying industrial relocation; Voluntary environmental regulation exhibits inverted U-shaped relationships with industrial relocation in direct and spillover effects, and works through increased external cost rather than internal cost. Its spatial spillover radiates the longest 1250 km due to rapid spread of public opinions, but this effect takes more than 3 years to be effective.
论文信息;
Title/题目:
Reassessment of the potential for centralized and distributed photovoltaic power generation in China: On a prefecture-level city scale
Authors/作者:
Keywords /关键词
Compliance costs;Frontiers of policy effectiveness;Heterogeneous environmental regulations;Industrial relocation;Non-linear effects
DOI: 10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2022.116188
全文链接：
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36113295/
